LastPass

LastPass is a freemium password manager that stores encrypted passwords online. In a statement, the company said that the threat actor “was also able to copy a ...

“If you reuse your master password and that password was ever compromised, a threat actor may use dumps of compromised credentials that are already available on the Internet to attempt to access your account,” said the company. It means that the threat actor may attempt to use brute force to “guess your master password and decrypt the copies of vault data they took”. In a statement, the company said that the threat actor “was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data”.

Password management giant LastPass has revealed that hackers that breached the firm in August made off with encrypted customer vault data and unencrypted ...

“As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. In a lengthy update yesterday, it revealed that the August incident resulted in hackers getting hold of “source code and technical information” from the firm’s development environment, which were subsequently used to target another employee. [originally said ](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/lastpass-hackers-stole-source-code/)that the incident only resulted in a breach of “source code and some proprietary LastPass technical information.”

In August, LastPass said that some of its cloud servers were compromised, allowing a hacker to access an employee account. Then, earlier this month, it said the ...

LastPass says it would take a million years for that to happen if you follow all of its best practices. Of course, if the hacker figures that out, they would have full access to your saved data. Even worse, the company couldn't even be bothered to send an email explaining what happened, instead expecting you to do the hard work. That information is stored in an encrypted format, with the key known only to the user's local client. What you might want to do is change the passwords you use to log into anything sensitive, like banking, credit cards, medical records, or your email accounts. I get that it's all highly technical, but if you're trying to tell your customers what happened to their personal data, it seems like it would be better if it were easy to read and understand. It's the kind of email you send when you want to be able to say you sent an email, but don't want to talk about what happened. It's almost surprising that LastPass somehow managed to write its blog post using the least customer-friendly language possible (what is a "threat actor?" The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. The encryption and decryption of data is performed only on the local LastPass client The first problem is that LastPass didn't even bother to put any sort of update in the email itself. Then, earlier this month, it said the hacker used the information to access customer data.

Password management firm LastPass has issued an update about a security breach that was first revealed back in August. The news is not good; the data breach ...

The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. Because of the hashing and encryption methods we use to protect our customers, it would be extremely difficult to attempt to brute force guess master passwords for those customers who follow our password As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. The news is not good; the data breach is significantly worse than [initial reports](https://betanews.com/2022/09/18/lastpass-reveals-details-of-august-hack-that-gave-threat-actor-access-to-its-development-environment-for-four-days/) suggested. LastPass production services currently operate from on-premises data centers with cloud-based storage used for various purposes such as storing backups and regional data residency requirements. LastPass says that its investigations into the incident now show that the hackers were able to obtain customer vault data.

Encrypted password manager LastPass has revealed hackers were able to copy a backup of customer vault data in a recent data breach.

It means that hacker may attempt to use brute force to guess your master password and decrypt the copies of vault data they took. LastPass in a statement said the hacker was able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. Encrypted password manager LastPass has revealed hackers were able to copy a backup of customer vault data in a recent data breach.

A malicious actor copied personal information from LastPass' third-party cloud storage provider.

It also noted that while the company uses hashing and encryption methods to protect customer data, the malicious actors may use “brute force” in an attempt to guess customers’ master passwords and decrypt the copies of the vault data they stole. It recommended that those who do not follow these best practices change passwords for the websites they currently have stored in their LastPass account. [steal source code and technical information](https://www.cshub.com/attacks/news/lastpasss-source-code-stolen-in-data-breach) from LastPass’ development environment that was then used to target an employee.

Following breach, LastPass attackers have made off with unencrypted customer data and copies of backups of customer vault data.

I don’t doubt many users will be disappointed with LastPass and will be looking for an alternative password manager to store their passwords – perhaps even one that’s not cloud-based (though that comes with drawbacks, such as no password syncing capabilities, which makes life more difficult). Evaluate the content of your secure notes and data that LastPass automatically inserts in online forms, and change what can be changed. They know the users’ name, email address and phone number, and the online services they use, so users should be on the lookout for a variety of phishing attempts in the coming days and months. And if you were using a weak (or worse, previously leaked) master password when they were stolen, you’re screwed,” LastPass says that, if users followed best security practices – having a master password of 12+ characters and not having used it for other accounts – current password-cracking technology will get attackers nowhere. The encryption and decryption of data is performed only on the local LastPass client.”

LastPass CEO, Karim Toubba, has confirmed that a threat actor has stolen customer password vaults.

No company can be 100% safe from breaches; that’s a simple truth, but trust is paramount in the world of password management, and there can be little doubt that trust is being tested hard right now. For business customers using the federated login services provided by LastPass, Toubba says that the threat actor "did not have access to the key fragments stored in customer Identity Provider’s or LastPass’ infrastructure, and they were not included in the backups that were copied that contained customer vaults." The transparency in declaring breaches is always to be applauded, although questions remain as to why it has taken so long to determine and disclose that password vaults had been stolen. I also recommend, in the interests of better safe than sorry, that all users change their master password as doing so should re-encrypt the password vault after doing so. Fast forward to the end of November, and LastPass stated information obtained during that earlier compromise had enabled a threat actor to access "certain elements" of customer data within a third-party cloud storage service. I would have to agree, plus changing that master password to something much stronger.

[T]he threat actor gained access to the Development environment using a developer's compromised endpoint. While the method used for the initial endpoint ...

[said this](https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2022/08/29/lastpass-source-code-breach-do-we-still-recommend-password-managers/): “If you want to change some or all of your passwords, we’re not going to talk you out of it. But] we don’t think you need to change your passwords. - Only requiring 2FA authentication for initial login, then allowing some sort of “single sign-on” system to authenticate you automatically for a wide range of internal services. [T]he threat actor gained access to the Development environment using a developer’s compromised endpoint. Note that you need to change the passwords that are stored inside your vault, as well as the master password for the vault itself. - Issuing “bearer access tokens” for automated software tools, based on occasional 2FA authentication by developers, testers and engineering staff. The good news, LastPass continues to insist, is that the security of your backed-up passwords in your vault file should be no different from the security of any other cloud backup that you encrypted on your own computer before you uploaded it. The attack that led to an attack - Doing full 2FA authentication only occasionally, such as requesting new one-time codes only every few days or weeks. The crooks therefore now not only know where you and your computer live, thanks to the leaked billing and IP address data mentioned above, but also have a detailed map of where you go when you’re online: If you have an automated build-and-test script that needs to access various servers and databases at various points in the process, you don’t want the script continually interrupted to wait for you to type in yet another 2FA code. Of course, “we have seen no evidence” isn’t a very strong statement (not least because instransigent companies can make it come true by deliberately failing to look for evidence in the first place, or by letting someone else collect the evidence and then purposefully refusing to look at it), even though it’s often all that any company can truthfully say in the immediate aftermath of a breach.

Password manager LastPass announced on Thursday that hackers had accessed and copied a backup of data including customers' passwords in an encrypted format.

“We are committed to keeping you informed of our findings, and to updating you on the actions we are taking and any actions that you may need to perform. In the meantime, our services are running normally, and we continue to operate in a state of heightened alert. Toubba wrote: “The master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. As this explainer from the 3blue1brown YouTube channel shows, it would take hackers with today’s technology an impossibly long time to brute force a key of that size. However those with weaker passwords, including business customers who do not use LastPass’ federated login services, were told they “should consider minimizing risk by changing passwords of websites you have stored.” “If you reuse your master password and that password was ever compromised, a threat actor may use dumps of compromised credentials that are already available on the Internet to attempt to access your account,” LastPass CEO Karim Toubba

Password breaches have been a recurring issue in the Web2 ecosystem, but Web3 may eliminate the problem.

They use browser extension wallets like Metamask or Trustwallet to sign in using a cryptographic signature, eliminating the need for a password to be stored in the cloud. As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass.” To solve this problem, password management services like LastPass have been invented. This means that the attacker may be able to crack some website passwords of LastPass users through brute force guessing. Password management service LastPass was hacked in August 2022, and the attacker stole users’ encrypted passwords, according to a Dec. LastPass first disclosed the breach in August 2022 but at that time, it appeared that the attacker had only obtained source code and technical information, not any customer data.

LastPass case underscores the downside of password managers as a single point of failure and the need for security teams to focus on cloud security.

“Capturing the encrypted databases is more problematic as this means all the attacker needs now is to send targeted phishes to people to get that password,” said Bambenek. “The latest LastPass breach originated in the cloud — no endpoint or on-prem device could have detected the incident,” Benjamin said. Benjamin said the legacy approach to data security has proven ineffective in modern IT environments time and time again.