Firearm

That the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension "was able to assemble the shotgun components using a stock bolt and a stock bolt washer from another firearm" "was ...

Stat. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the unassembled shotgun parts in this case constituted a firearm within the meaning of Minn. Treating the firearm determination as a question of fact addresses Stone's concern that "at some point, a 'firearm' missing components clearly ceases to be a firearm." In LaMere, the supreme court explained that because the defendant did not admit that the gun at issue was a "dangerous weapon," the district court should have submitted that issue to the jury instead of instructing the jury that it was a "dangerous weapon" as a matter of law. Stone argues that "[a]n incomplete firearm that cannot be assembled into a firearm either for purposes of brandishing as a threat or to fire simply is not a firearm." And in Knaeble, this court reasoned that "[e]ven if the actual use of the firearm is not at issue, its potential use by display is sufficient under Gerdes to extend the statute's scope to inoperable weapons." For example, in LaMere, the supreme court reasoned: "so long as a firearm has the apparent ability to inflict injury, the victim of an assault or robbery will respond in the same way whether or not the gun is loaded. 1b(a), "without proof that the firearm was operable at the time of the possession." Stone does not dispute that the unassembled shotgun in this case was designed for attack or defense and to expel a projectile by action of an explosive force. 2 (1980), "the operability of the weapon at the time of possession is immaterial." 1982), the supreme court held that for purposes of a conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun under Minn. State, the supreme court held that a firearm that was temporarily inoperable because of a mechanical defect was nonetheless a "firearm" for purposes of Minn.